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Looking In or Looking Out? 
Top-down Change and Operational Capability
Mark Lemon, John Craig & Matthew Cook 
Abstract: Strategic intentions reflect the aspirations of an organization. They can also be translated 
into targets for the rest of the organization and structures, procedures, measures and associated 
rules introduced to meet them. Drawing upon insight from social systems theory, and case study 
evidence from the telecommunications industry, this conceptual paper suggests that the ensuing 
implementation processes can conflict with the principles and objectives of actors at operational 
levels and lead to behaviors that can hinder the pursuit of those high level goals. This 
misalignment, or pathological autopoiesis, is manifest through a restructuring in which the 
organization becomes the environment for operational actors who in turn focus upon the 
"translation" of imposed conditions into their own psychic and social needs. In effect the 
organization turns in on itself and away from the need to acquire information about, and respond to, 
its own environment, a condition that is fundamental to the resilience and survival of any system. 
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1. Introduction: From the Inside Looking In
The view of organizations as static entities, waiting to be "done to," is increasingly 
questioned (HODGE & CORONADO, 2007). Whether we think of them as 
complex, irreversible and manifesting emergent characteristics (STACEY, 1996; 
CILLIERS, 1998; ALLEN, 2007), as the interaction and juxtaposition of multiple 
actors—human and otherwise (LAW, 1992 and 1994; LATOUR, 1993) or as the 
recursive interaction of form and behavior (GIDDENS, 1984; BECK, GIDDENS & 
LASH, 1994; SCHNEIDEWIND & PETERSON, 1998) organizations are linked 
and co-evolutionary processes. In consequence they also defy a management 
approach that is based upon a linear transformation from the articulation of 
strategic aims to their operationalization. [1]
Martin GREN and Wolfgang ZIERHOFER (2003) follow LUHMANN's (1995) 
observation that the contemporary industrial landscape has become one of 
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increasing differentiation and restricted or specialized functionality in which each 
sub-system has its own codes and protocols. This reduction of function also 
means that the transformation of abstract, cross cutting and high level vision into 
action, is seldom smooth or aligned in the way that senior management would 
choose. BEER and EISENSTAT (2000) suggest six key barriers or "silent killers" 
to the effective implementation of strategy, albeit it well conceived. These reflect 
the difficulty of implementing change into emergent, multi-scalar systems and 
include top down senior management style, conflicting priorities and poor 
communication and co-ordination within and between the organization's 
functions. This broadly conceptual paper will suggest an additional barrier, 
namely the tendency of some rules and procedures, often driven by inappropriate 
performance measures and targets, to direct an organization's attention inwards 
and away from its external environment. The environment, or that over which the 
system—organization has no direct control, includes a set of economic forces 
associated with an industry, associated competition and market conditions more 
generally. [2]
The paper will argue that the implementation of some procedures from the top-
down, albeit in pursuit of consensual high level objectives, can result in a social 
restructuring at operational level that mitigates against the achievement of those 
high level aims—in the case example outlined below these aims are operational 
efficiency and enhanced customer satisfaction. This systemic reproduction or 
autopoiesis, will be seen as the emergent relationship between the receptivity of 
operational actors (JEFFREY & SEATON, 2004) and their willingness and ability 
to acquire information about the environment in which they operate. The resulting 
communication deficit provides an example of what GREGORY (2006) terms 
pathological autopoiesis and occurs between operational actors, between 
customers and those actors and thereby between customers and the 
organization. This process of mutually (un)informative and emergent interaction, 
or structural coupling, highlights the distinction made by LEYDESDORFF (2000) 
between the transfer of information between actors and its communication to the 
organization. The ability of a system to respond to its external environment is key 
to its adaptive capability or resilience; this ability is in turn largely determined by 
the information about that environment and the communication of that information 
into the system. DEGELE (2008) highlights the intentional aspect of control 
before suggesting that where there is limited information the ability to control or 
adapt is compromised. By extension it can be argued that where information 
about the external environment resides in specific social structures, and is not fed 
into an organization, the ability to control is correspondingly compromised. It is 
the paradox that results from an organizational desire to respond to external 
conditions through top-down control leading to the acquisition and retention of 
information about the environment at operational levels that forms the basis of 
the following discussion. [3]
Any top management, as part of its survival strategy, has a duty to set out high 
level objectives and ethics within a Logically Coherent Culture (ARCHER, 1996) 
which is designed to encompass all aspects of the company's vision for itself. 
However, organizational mission statements developed by those following a 
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planned approach to strategy are often dismissed as meaningless or disreputable 
(EDEN & ACKERMAN, 1998) because they appear ambiguous and fail to 
translate into a framework for action. They appear like proverbs for general 
consumption, the motherhood and apple pie of management. While the Planning 
School has been criticized for an overly controlling approach to strategic 
planning, resulting in a lack of learning, there has been an increasing acceptance 
of the need for strategies to emerge, or form, as well as be formulated 
(MINTZBERG, 1990; MINTZBERG, AHLSTRAND & LAMPEI, 1998). Emergence 
in this context is interpreted as the interaction of phenomena generating 
something that is qualitatively new and cannot be deconstructed into its 
constituent parts (LEMON & JEFFREY, 1998). Where the organizational culture 
does not recognize this characteristic as part of its planning it is unlikely to learn 
about the environment with which it interacts and within which it operates. Of 
course this has to be aligned with more structured procedures for acquiring that 
information, and through communication, assimilating it as the basis for both 
strategic adaptation and operational action (knowledge). [4]
The need to incorporate an acceptance of emergence into a Logically Coherent 
Culture is particularly important among the different socio-cultural groupings that 
exist across and between management and operational levels (CRAIG & 
LEMON, 2008). Concurrently, actors from the different social groups interact and 
restructure both with each other and with their environment i.e. that which lies 
outside. This structural coupling (LEYDESDORFF, 2000) may occur between 
social systems within an organization, both laterally and hierarchically, but also 
independently between those systems and their environment (GREN & 
ZIERHOFER, 2003). By extension LUHMANN's definition of communication as 
the unity of information, message and understanding (LEYDESDORFF, 2000, 
2003) would allow for potentially conflicting outcomes in which the communication 
within a coherent culture is transmitted and understood while supporting action 
that is inconsistent with the high level intentions behind the message; pathological 
autopoiesis (GREGORY, 2006). [5]
The purpose of this conceptual paper will be to explore how some of the insights 
into social systems inspired by the work of Niklas LUHMANN might contribute to 
an explanation of how and why consensual high level objectives can, following 
specific intervention strategies, result in an operational restructuring that reduces 
rather than enhances the resilience of that organization. Work undertaken by the 
authors into the attainment of environmental management systems and 
standards (CRAIG & LEMON, 2008), sustainable schools (LEMON, CHARNLEY 
& WRIGHT, 2010), product service systems (COOK, BHAMRA & LEMON, 2006) 
and telecommunications (LEMON & SAHOTA, 2004) provide examples of the 
potential for strategies, often operationalized through the pursuit of targets and 
associated measures, to have counter-productive outcomes. This paper will focus 
primarily upon how the social systems literature can help make sense of this 
phenomenon and will draw upon a case study from within the telecommunications 
sector to provide some exemplar data. [6]
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The case study context will be briefly introduced in Section 2; subsequent 
sections will then integrate examples from the case with theoretical discussion in 
support of a number of propositions. The final section of the paper will pull this 
discussion together in terms of both organizational resilience or adaptive 
capability and the potential contribution to this understanding made by LUHMANN 
and commentators on his work. Some additional methodological observations will 
be made about researching complex organizational phenomena. [7]
2. Case Context and Methodology
As discussed above the counterproductive potential of top-down strategies, 
particularly when manifest through the pursuit of targets, can be observed in 
many contexts (e.g. education—the pursuit by schools of qualifications 
compromising effective learning; policing—the attainment of arrests 
compromising the reduction of crime and fear of crime; health—the turnover of 
patients compromising patient care). While the purpose of this paper is primarily 
to explore the potential of theory to help make sense of such processes the 
discussion will draw on case study research undertaken with field engineers 
engaged in customer service within a large UK based telecommunications 
company. [8]
A number of strategic initiatives were introduced by the case study organization in 
the early 2000's to facilitate a more autonomous technical workforce in the field. 
These included the introduction of lap-top computers for job allocation, 
description and logistical information and the encouragement of working from 
home rather than out of local centers. Alongside these measures field engineers 
were expected to work alone rather than in pairs. The strategic rationale behind 
the move towards autonomy and the "effective" deployment of the field force was 
to provide a more responsive and better quality service to the customer. Concern 
was expressed among some of the organization's internal research groups, 
responsible for exploring customer satisfaction within the company, that these 
changes were having an adverse effect upon the level of service provided and 
were becoming a source of demotivation among the field engineers. [9]
In order to investigate whether this was the case a mixed method approach was 
undertaken. This consisted of firstly, semi-structured interviews with members of 
the field engineering and customer service research team. These interviews, 
which took place over a three month visiting fellowship for the lead author, 
explored the changes that were being introduced, the rationale behind them, the 
mechanisms for their introduction and the perceived impact that they were 
having. Additional interviews were also carried out with field engineers and their 
line managers in their depot in the South East of England and while 
accompanying them on their rounds over several days. The purpose of the 
interviews was to establish how the ongoing and proposed changes were 
perceived by the engineers and what impact they felt they would have on the 
delivery of their service to customers. These perceptions were compared with the 
views of the customer service research team and the documented organizational 
rationale. A further day was spent in the call center responsible for the region 
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eliciting how the relationships between operators, engineers and their supervisory 
staff had been affected by the changes. [10]
In general terms these visits and the accompanying interviews were intended to 
provide an in-depth understanding about the factors constraining or facilitating 
effective customer service from the perspective of the technicians and their 
managers. The more specific interests of the research focused on how the 
policies had affected the social inter-action and information exchange between 
the field engineers, the motivation of the engineers and the changing nature of 
trust within, and between, organizational roles. The influence of these factors on 
the level of customer service, and the potential for the changes to have 
counterproductive outcomes, will provide a background example to the core 
conceptual theme of this paper. To explore how social systems thinking might 
help us understand why top down interventions can constrain the ability of an 
organization to learn about, and respond to, its external environment; a key 
feature of an adaptive and resilient system. [11]
2.1 Learning at the customer interface: Communication and motivation
Few operational employees would distance themselves from the sentiments in 
the following company statement or indeed from many of its' "values" and 
principles: We put our customers first; we are professional; we respect each other; 
we work as one team and we are committed to continuous improvement. [12]
The jump from such principles to operations is considerable with one being 
abstract and general and the other specific and contextual. The process is 
mediated through the setting of goals and the formulation of strategy with its 
associated rules and procedures. Responses to these interventions (e.g. 
independent rather than pair based working) are incorporated into the following 
text. This is intended to help explain the relevance of, and reasons for, specific 
operational activities and perceptions. It will also exemplify where and how they 
might run counter to the intentions of the strategies that were introduced to 
facilitate the improved effectiveness of field operations—the installation and 
maintenance of domestic and business based telecommunications. [13]
Many of the rules, procedures and measures such as key performance indicators 
that are normally introduced to improve efficiency have a direct impact upon, and 
may even be targeted at, the social interaction within a workforce and thereby 
their ability to communicate and inform on both technical and customer 
satisfaction issues (IRONS, 1997). In this context LUHMANN argued that not only 
are systems determined by their interaction with the external environment but 
components of that system would have their own independent interactions with 
that environment (BAILEY, 2005; GREN & ZIERHOFER, 2003). [14]
While companies frequently try to manage how information is communicated 
through formal mechanisms such as training and the structuring of internal social 
interaction (team meetings etc.) information can also be transferred through 
informal and self-organized social interaction. The following quotes by field 
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engineers are indicative of the potential value of, and limitations to, the 
information that could be communicated through this type of formal and informal 
social interaction. In the former quote the transfer of explicit knowledge through 
informal mechanisms is recognized and might refer to technical guidance or 
geographical information or insight about customer characteristics. Equally of 
course the interaction may focus solely on conversations unrelated to work or 
criticism of the company and the formulation of strategies to undermine its 
procedures.
"We used to meet in the café more often. If one of us had difficulty with a job then 
one of the others, who had the necessary knowledge, would usually help." 
(experienced field engineer)
"Team meetings occur once a month and get two-thirds attendance. They usually 
contain one-way dissemination of information." (new field engineer) [15]
With regard to the latter quote the team meetings did provide an opportunity for 
informal social interaction among the field engineers even if there was limited 
opportunity for "feeding back" experience from the field into the organization. It 
was noted that the engineers were the only people to have direct contact with 
customers, all other "communication" tended to go through call centers. Despite 
skepticism about the value of such meetings, there remained some concern 
about the perceived decrease in importance that was attached to them by the 
organization as it sought to encourage more autonomous working practices. 
Attempts to make field engineers more independent were aligned with the 
intention to increase their productive effectiveness. This was related to new, time 
dependent, productivity measures and meant that the technicians or engineers 
were more mobile and not patch based. A field manager noted a similar 
phenomenon with regard to his own role:
"We get moved around a lot so we don't really know the technicians or the areas that 
we are dealing with. I nearly sent one man into a place called (...) until I was told that 
they regularly set fire to equipment there and it is usual to send two men." (field 
manager, supervisor) [16]
As discussed above, these changes had a perceived impact upon the ability of 
the workforce to share information. It was also felt to affect the way individual 
jobs were undertaken, by reducing flexibility and ironically the necessary 
autonomy to be flexible. This indicates the complicated relationship between 
autonomy and level of control (DEGELE, 2008). Autonomy can be interpreted as 
working alone under well-defined rules and procedures. Alternatively it can be 
taken to mean the willingness and ability to modify rules and procedures as and 
when it is appropriate. 
"We often put in higher specification equipment to help the next technician. The field 
manager is not happy but in the long run it will save time." (experienced field 
engineer).
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"Home starts are good for the company because they save time but they are not 
good for team working. When field engineers cannot complete jobs, they lose the 
productivity. They are not encouraged to be good team players." (member of the 
customer service research team) [17]
The issue of team working and team building is contrasted with individualistic 
working practices through the flexibility that can be incorporated into local teams 
by mixing or balancing different skills sets. This reduction in interface 
opportunities and the related opportunity for reflexive interaction inevitably 
reduces the learning and adaptive capability of local actors (LUHMANN, 1995). 
Indeed if, as LUHMANN proposes, society is communication and decisions rely 
on communication, decisions in the field will also be less adaptive and by 
extension constrain the organization's ability to learn (DAFT & HUBER, 1987). [18]
Proposition 1: Rules and policies that limit the informal interaction among 
personnel also reduce the exchange of information that can facilitate adaptive 
responses. [19]
2.2 Working as a team—where are the boundaries?
The introduction of changes that restrict the levels of interaction between field 
engineers have been seen to affect the potential of the organization to learn 
about its environment. They also reduced the opportunity of the engineers to self-
organize in response to specific environmental conditions. Issues arose about 
how the transfer of explicit and tacit knowledge (NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, 1995; 
LAM, 2000; LEMON & SAHOTA, 2004) affected the ability of the engineers to 
function as teams. By working alone, rather than in pairs the potential for 
mentoring inexperienced by experienced engineers was compromised, although it 
was reflected in more extensive formal training. This highlighted a focus on 
explicit rather than tacit knowledge. It also resulted in a failure to transfer 
information between the, often younger, newcomers with extensive technological 
knowledge, acquired through this training, and the more experienced engineers 
who only engaged with such innovations intermittently. [20]
One aspect of a flexible, if not necessarily reflexive, team was seen as a mix of 
generalist and specialist skills; this raised two specific concerns. Firstly, under 
certain performance criteria, particularly those that are influenced by the time 
spent on a job, the technical specialist could be allocated the complicated tasks 
that are time-consuming. This can make it difficult for them to meet their targets if 
such tasks are not allocated separate standard times. 
"The best engineers have the lowest productivity because they get the most difficult 
jobs—they get penalized for this and this causes resentment." (member of the 
customer service research team) [21]
The focus on time, combined with the reduced interaction between engineers 
also meant that there were no mechanisms for the sharing of expertise 
associated with a particular problem in time and place. In addition the 
© 2010 FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 11(3), Art. 27, Mark Lemon, John Craig & Matthew Cook: 
Looking In or Looking Out? Top-down Change and Operational Capability
development of a generic heuristic from a range of similar problems was also 
constrained. [22]
Secondly, multi-skilled personnel were often (self) perceived to be poorly 
rewarded, particularly when their "unrecognized by management" skills relate to 
defusing negative situations, supporting distressed customers or engaging with 
them to obtain and diffuse information. 
"Multi-skilled people are not rewarded ... they should be because they are leaving to 
go up to non-operational positions." (field manager, supervisor) [23]
These perceptions raise a fundamental question about the need to respond to, 
and meet, productivity targets that may result in the emergence of behaviors that 
run counter to one of the underlying corporate principles, namely the pursuit of 
customer satisfaction. The vision of the company operating as a team, therefore, 
often contrasts with the perception of some of the functional relationships or 
social systems that have been introduced into the customer service process. This 
extends into the following example where the information provided to field 
engineers was perceived to be inadequate. 
"There is a barrier ... the front (call center) and back (field engineers)—end need to 
be put more directly in contact with each other. The front end is often hostile and 
misunderstands the requirements of the technicians in the field. There is a need for 
sales, control and technicians to experience other roles." (member of the customer 
service research team) [24]
The rules and procedures pursued by the call center operatives often meant that 
the information collected from the customer was not seen to match the 
requirements of the field engineer. It follows that these rules and procedures, 
formal or informal, did not match the needs in the field nor of the company in 
general. This implies that the company strategy was ill-conceived or ill-
implemented and call center training was inadequate. [25]
While these statements describe an operational disparity they do not address 
some of the key factors that underpin the problem. For example, the resulting 
"inwardness" that results from productivity measures tied to a specific role rather 
than to addressing how that role fits within, and benefits, the overall process; 
ironically incorporated under the high level aim of customer satisfaction. There 
was also a perception among the field personnel that customers were not 
provided with adequate information and this often resulted in difficult situations. 
For example the term estimated time to repair was often interpreted by the 
customer as a completion time, whereas it signified the potential time of arrival. 
Where customers had made alternative arrangements based upon their 
expectation of completion, they would often be frustrated at what is perceived as 
a delayed start, let alone finish, to the job. This was seen by the engineers or 
technicians not only as a failure to inform the customer but also to understand the 
role of the technician and the skills required to deal with social as well as 
technical difficulties. Each of the previous examples suggest that the successful 
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communication of "appropriate" information between roles operating on the same 
level (sales and technicians), and from the top down and bottom up, is indicative 
of the need to be more aware of how those roles fit in to the bigger picture 
(WEBB, LETTICE & LEMON, 2006; COLEY & LEMON, 2008). Indeed one of the 
roles claimed for matrix management (DE LAAT, 1994) is to ensure that all 
elements of the agency side of management from design through to field 
engineers can call upon all the resources within those organizational elements. [26]
Proposition 2: It is essential that the procedures and performance measures 
attached to one part of a linked process do not lead to behaviors that restrict 
capability elsewhere. Where performance measures are used they must be in the 
context of the whole process—and take account of the operating environment. [27]
The previous two sections have highlighted the need to obtain, filter and process 
information about the environment as the basis for adaptive behavior. What this 
also suggests is that the nature of the task (field engineering) is modified 
alongside and interactively with changing internal relationships, (among 
engineers) and the nature of information that is communicated between them and 
with other actors in customer service provision (e.g. customers, line 
management, call centers). This reproduction will inevitably change the 
boundaries between the field engineers and their environment—i.e. other 
engineers may now be "outside" and thereby part of the environment. This in turn 
raises questions about how flexible the new structures are in terms of meeting 
their high level aims (efficient service, customer satisfaction) and related to that 
the level and type of trust that might exist in order to facilitate, or hinder, those 
efforts. [28]
2.3 Trust and flexibility
One of the features of introducing change into an organization is that it 
encourages people away from the familiar and in so doing may serve to disrupt 
habitual behaviors, positive or negative (MARECHAL, 2009). Niklas LUHMANN 
(2000) differentiates familiarity from trust through the introduction of risk and the 
possibility that the outcome of a decision may result in greater damage than 
benefit. This is an ironic distinction in the context of the current discussion where 
the outcome of a policy decision may result in behaviors and the re-structuring of 
social relations that are not necessarily to the benefit of the organization; the 
pathological autopoiesis discussed by GREGORY (2006). [29]
The reduction of social interaction between technicians inevitably affects the 
potential for "companion" or relationship trust (NEWELL & SWAN, 2000) that is 
grounded in a personal bond with an individual or social group and restricts the 
adaptivity that can result from such close relationships e.g. information sharing, 
help with difficult jobs and the limitation of bad practice: "Because he works from 
home we never really benefit from his knowledge on the job" (member of the 
customer research team). [30]
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Equally of course such trust can reinforce the emergence of behaviors and 
associated social systems that support poor practice or indeed behaviors that are 
to the disadvantage of the organization while being beneficial to certain sub-
groupings within it (e.g. free-loading, stealing of materials from site). MARS 
(1994) suggests that this requires the existence of a stronger attachment to, or 
fear of, a sub culture or social system than that which exists to the organization 
as a whole. Such behavior can of course become institutionalized when the 
organization finds it easier, for social and or economic reasons, to accept such 
behavior than to address it. The generation and perpetuation of such 
"pathological" sub groups can also be sustained by the re-drawing of boundary 
conditions such that the organization constitutes the external environment that 
the group has to manage and respond to. This phenomenon may also result in 
behaviors that can be beneficial to the organization but not anticipated by it. One 
example of this is where groups of field engineers agree to put in higher 
specification equipment to reduce problems in the future. This relies either on the 
personal trust of line managers and the competence of the technician or the 
collective agreement among the field engineers to operate in a way that is not 
sanctioned by the organization. [31]
While much of the focus on trust in an organizational context is attributed to 
competence, of procedures, technology and people (BURNS & FLAM, 1990; 
NEWELL & SWAN, 2000), LEANA and VAN BUREN (2000) argue that it binds 
employers and employees together as well as employees to one another and 
creates value by facilitating successful collective action. In an earlier paper 
LEANA and VEN BUREN (1999) highlight two components of this social capital 
as associability and trust where trust can be fragile and based on risk and reward 
calculations. Within this arena there is the specific trust between co-workers and 
a generalized trust that the company is "treating them right"; in the case study 
presented here the first was prevailing, although not always across operational 
roles (e.g. engineers and call center operatives) but the second was under severe 
stress affecting top management, operational agency and customer alike. [32]
Evidence of a pervasive distrust has been the emergence of operational (field 
engineers) concerns relating to perceptions of competence. Competence trust in 
this context appears to have more to do with the perceived relevance and 
effectiveness of the procedures that people are expected to follow than to the skill 
of the individuals themselves. The engineers argued that the information 
collected and distributed by call centers was determined by the center's targets 
and not the requirements in the field. This concern was reinforced by the 
"rationalization" of those centers to regional hubs that could be a considerable 
distance from a field engineers' "patch" with the result that there was no 
guarantee of the necessary "local" knowledge being used to support the 
allocation of jobs to the engineers or information to the customer. [33]
As discussed above, the move towards individual working practices was 
accompanied by a perceived reduction in the amount of training that experienced 
technicians received and led to concern over the acquisition and updating of core 
competencies, and the potential danger that customers will have a reduced level 
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of trust in operational capability. This competence based trust (NEWELL & 
SWAN, 2000) is as closely related to the processes that affect the way in which 
skills and information are specified and acquired (e.g. training procedures relating 
to customer interaction) as to deficiencies in either (e.g. not possessing specific 
skills). The latter is perceived as a symptom rather than a cause of problems that 
are ultimately seen to affect customer relations. [34]
The perceived need by some engineers/technicians to focus on customer 
satisfaction rather than performance productivity coincided with the perception 
that the customer tends to get ignored because the technician is in a hurry. 
Concerns over the appropriateness of information, and the "breadth" of training 
were seen to compound the operational constraints that were felt to result from 
an undue emphasis upon meeting performance targets. Indeed the ability to step 
outside of accepted procedures in an appropriate way would be enhanced by 
relevant information and diverse skills, including the preparedness to take 
considered risks—e.g. to spend time with a customer who may be interested in 
purchasing additional services. [35]
Confidence in the judgment that underpins such a decision highlights a mix of 
competence and relationship trust between the line manager and the field 
engineer. The competence associated with making an informed decision leading 
to behavior that is outside of standard procedures, and the support for that 
decision, relates as much to the existence of trust as a principle, that should not 
be abused, as it does to the ability to think and operate outside of a prescribed 
norm,. It is unlikely that such a decision would be taken without some confidence 
that no penalty would ensue or that the skills (technical or social) existed to 
support the subsequent activity. Where these conditions do not exist the potential 
damage may indeed be greater than the benefits incurred but may also relate as 
much to the relationship between field engineer and line manager as between 
customer and organization. [36]
Proposition 3: The freedom to act outside of a rule/role boundary requires 
reciprocated trust. [37]
2.4 Customer satisfaction versus productivity
As outlined above, field engineers undertake the majority of face-to-face 
interaction with the customer and a key component of an organization's ability to 
respond to its operating environment is the competence and persona of its 
engineers to undertake this task effectively. While many of the engineers felt that 
this was a fundamental aspect of their role there was also a perception that the 
organization failed to recognize its importance. This was expressed through a 
lack of training about customer interface and inadequate mechanisms for feeding 
information from, and about, customers back into the system. Productivity 
measures were not perceived to account for the inter-personal environment that 
can affect the course of a job and the subsequent perception of the company by 
the customer. 
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"Field engineers are deemed to be sufficiently skilled if they can install a service even 
though they may be unable explain it to the customer." (experienced field engineer) [38]
The willingness of many engineers to engage with the customer was seen as an 
expression of commitment and a motivating factor in their work. It also highlighted 
a key paradox in their role. Performance measures and targets are productivity 
driven, whereas "personal" measures often coincide with the underlying principles 
associated with customer satisfaction. This leads to a tension between one set of 
principle-based measures that are motivational and another set of productivity 
measures that can have a de-motivating effect if not properly designed. [39]
The importance that is attached to social skills and customer satisfaction by some 
engineers is an example of where underlying principles can be seen to transcend 
personal boundaries (ASHFORTH, KREINER & FUGATE, 2000). In other words 
they are pertinent to all aspects of life, including that of being a customer. The 
potential for conflict and demotivation arises from a failure of an organization to 
value soft skills. [40]
MIRCHANDANI (1998) discusses the problems that highly trained telecommuters 
experience in gaining acceptance for the "soft" domestic roles that inevitably 
intrude into their home working. A similar situation appeared to be in evidence 
with the limited recognition of "soft skills" in the customer service workplace. By 
focusing on the technological aspects of the field technician / engineer's role 
management may have been in pursuit of a less effective strategy for achieving 
customer satisfaction than if they had recognized the variability of that role and 
the skills required to undertake it. [41]
Proposition 4: In order to respond to the uncertainties of their operating 
environment organizations must recognize, and nurture, the social capabilities of 
their technical personnel. [42]
3. Discussion and Conclusions
This short paper has suggested that social systems theoretical approaches can 
help explain a phenomenon observed by each of the author's in different contexts
—the potential for top down, target and measure oriented strategies to have 
counterproductive operational outcomes. It has been argued that while high level 
organizational ambitions such as improving the efficiency of local service delivery 
and enhanced customer satisfaction are likely to receive general support 
throughout an organization their translation into operations can result in behaviors 
that negate the very purpose for which they were introduced. One suggested 
reason for this is that when change is introduced from the top down, without 
adequate attention being paid to how it might lead to a re-structuring at lower 
organizational levels of social interaction, there is a danger that information about 
the external environment will be restricted. This may occur in part through 
changes in the relationships between operational personnel and in part as a 
result of the information that is acquired by those personnel about customer 
needs and experiences. Some strategic aims can therefore be devalued by a 
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failure to recognize important organizing, and often moral, principles for the 
operational personnel engaged in the pursuit of customer satisfaction (IRONS, 
1997). For example, one cause of this dissatisfaction for the case study field 
engineers was an apparent management failure to recognize the extent of the 
role that is played by them, in particular with regard to their social interaction with 
customers. [43]
In effect, the operationalization of high level aims can lead an organization to 
"turn in on itself," prioritizing compliance with its own procedures and measures 
and in so doing compromising the quality of the interface with its environment. 
Information about the environment and the assimilation of that, through 
communication, into the organization is, it has been argued, fundamental to the 
resilience and adaptive capability of that organization. It means that the 
organization may not be able to reflect, or respond to, the complexity of the 
environment within which, and with which, it is operating and interacting (ASHBY, 
1958; GREGORY, 2006). [44]
This inward focus may be linked to internal restructuring in which operational 
actors respond to their perception of how the organization expects them to act. A 
response that may of course also include the willingness and ability to circumvent 
those expectations in a bid to align with personal and collective intentions that are 
not consistent with the organization's high level ambitions and the associated 
rules and systems to meet them (MARS, 1994). Indeed the ability of operational 
staff to acquire information about the organizational environment may mean that 
they are better equipped to function in an adaptive and self-producing manner 
(LUHMANN, 2000). This may occur through the interaction between the 
operational social system and the organizational environment (e.g. responding to 
the market and customer requirements) and the potential for "pathological" 
autopoiesis where insight may support behaviors that benefit the operational staff 
concerned but not the organization as a whole. This raises an interesting 
question about whether the field engineers in the case study, and operational 
staff more generally, might re-structure in such a way that the organization 
becomes their environment. This extends the observations of MARS (1994) and 
BAILEY (2005) that sub-cultures or internal system components interact with the 
environment both independently and as part of the organization. [45]
Of course, a single case study can only provide limited supporting evidence for 
what is essentially a theoretical argument. It is hoped, however, that in 
combination they will stimulate research activity in other organizational contexts 
where change directs attention away from acquiring and assimilating information 
about the environment and towards the entrenchment of internal capabilities 
(LEMON & SAHOTA, 2004). [46]
In light of this special issue the paper suggests a number of methodological 
points for consideration. Firstly, the restructuring in response to top-down 
interventions results in emergent and, by implication, irreversible (DEGELE, 
2008) changes. Such changes occur both in terms of the (sub)systems under 
study and the environment with which they are interacting. The methodology 
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employed must be able to reflect that complexity. This highlights the value of 
longitudinal studies and raises questions about how we observe emergent 
phenomena when such an approach is not feasible—e.g. for reasons of timing or 
resources. It also suggests the need to access actors at each level of the system 
under observation and to draw upon theoretical insight to help interpret how they 
perceive the process(es) of change being explored (LEYDESDORFF, 2003). 
These actors are also observers, who are responding to transformations as they 
see them, and in so doing form part of that transformation (MATHUR, 2008). In 
this sense organizational research inevitably has a "second order" observational 
component to it. [47]
A final methodological point relates to the dangers of an anthropocentric 
approach to organizational studies. A key feature of complex systems is the 
interconnectivity of agents. The need to map out the social interactions between 
human actors is therefore very important as is an understanding of the way they 
individually, collectively and dynamically observe and make sense of their 
situation. While that situation may be socially constructed it is not constructed 
only of social actors. Our methodologies have to account for the technologies, 
economics, natural environment etc. which on the one hand provide the 
"objective" component of Karl WEICK's (1976) "loose coupling" while on the other 
interact to constitute complex systems. There is a need to systematically develop 
methodological and theoretical approaches that recognize all people as 
"potential" actors while accepting that not all actors are people (LAW, 2004). [48]
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the considerable contribution made by 
anonymous reviewers to this paper; all remaining weaknesses are, of course, 
entirely our own. 
References 
Allen, Peter (2007). The complexity of change and adaptation. E:CO, 9(3), vi-vii.
Archer, Margaret (1996). Culture and agency—culture in social theory, London: Sage.
Ashby, William (1958). An introduction to cybernetics. London: Chapman and Hall.
Ashforth, Blake; Kreiner, Glen & Fugate, Mel (2000). All in a day's work: Boundaries and micro role 
transitions. Academy of Management Review, 25(3), 472-491.
Bailey, Kenneth (2005). Beyond system internals: Expanding the scope of living systems theory, 
Systems Research and Behavioural Science, 22(6), 497-508.
Beck, Ulrich; Giddens, Anthony & Lash, Scott (1994). Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition  
and aesthetics in the modern social order. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beer, Michael & Eisenstat, Russell (2000). The silent killers of strategy implementation and 
learning. Sloan Management Review, Summer, 29-40.
Burns, Tom & Flam, Helena (1990). The shaping of social organization: Social rule system theory  
with applications. London: Sage.
Cilliers, Paul (1998). Complexity and postmodernism: Understanding complex systems. London: 
Routledge.
Coley, Fiona & Lemon, Mark (2008). Supporting multiple stakeholders in the design of more 
sustainable and systemic solutions. Design Principles and Practices, 2(2), 27-34. 
© 2010 FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 11(3), Art. 27, Mark Lemon, John Craig & Matthew Cook: 
Looking In or Looking Out? Top-down Change and Operational Capability
Cook, Mathew; Bhamra, Tracy & Lemon, Mark (2006). The transfer and application of sustainable 
product service systems in UK manufacturing companies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 14(17), 
1455-1465.
Craig, John & Lemon, Mark (2008). Perceptions and reality in quality and environmental 
management systems: A cross-country comparison. TQM Journal, 20(3), 196-208.
Daft, Richard & Huber, George (1987). How organizations learn: A communication framework. 
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 5, 1-36.
de Laat, Paul (1994). Matrix management of projects and power struggles: A case study of an R&D 
laboratory. Human Relations, 47(9), 1120.
Degele, Nina (2008). On controlling complex systems—a socio-cybernetic reflexion. Journal of  
Sociocybernetics, 6(2), 55-68. 
Eden, Colin & Ackerman, Fran (1998). Making strategy: The journey of strategic management. 
London: Sage.
Giddens, Anthony (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gregory, Amanda (2006). The state we are in: Insights from autopoiesis and complexity theory. 
Management Decision, 44(7), 962-972.
Gren, Martin & Zierhofer, Wolfgang (2003). The unity of difference: a critical appraisal of Niklas 
Luhmann's theory of social systems in the context of corporeality and spatiality. Environment and 
Planning A, 35, 615-630.
Hodge, Bob & Coronado, Gabriela (2007). Understanding change in organizations in a far-from-
equilibrium world. E:CO, 9(3), 3-15.
Irons, Ken (1997). The world of super-service. Harlow: Addison-Wesley.
Jeffrey, Paul & Seaton, Roger (2004). A conceptual model of receptivity applied to the design and 
deployment of water policy mechanisms. Environmental Sciences, 1(3), 277-300. 
Lam, Alice (2000). Tacit knowledge, organizational learning and societal institutions: An integrated 
framework. Organization Studies, 21(3), 487-513.
Latour, Bruno (1993). We have never been modern. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Law, John (1992). Notes on the theory of actor-network: Ordering strategy and heterogeneity. 
Systems Practice, 5(2), 379-393.
Law, John (1994). Organising modernity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Law, John (2004). After method. Abingdon: Routledge.
Leana, Carrie & Van Buren, Harry (1999). Organizational social capital and employment practices. 
Academy of Management Review, 24(3), 538-555.
Leana, Carrie & Van Buren, Harry (2000). Eroding organizational capital among US firms: The price  
of job instability, in the organization in crisis. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Lemon, Mark & Jeffrey, Paul (1998). Understanding the dynamics of sustainable communities: 
Stochasts, Cartesians and social networks. In Sarah Dwyer, Udo Ganslosser & Martin O'Connor 
(Eds.), Life science dimensions (pp.251-264). Furth: Filander.
Lemon, Mark & Sahota, Parminder (2004). Organizational culture as a knowledge repository for 
increased innovative capacity. Technovation, 6(June), 483-498.
Lemon, Mark; Charnley, Fiona & Wright, Andy (2010). Systems and sustainability: Learning from 
the move towards sustainable schools. The Environmentalist, 8, 18-19.
Leydesdorff, Loet (2000). Luhmann, Habermas and the theory of communication. Systems 
Research and Behavioural Science, 17(3), 273-288.
Leydesdorff, Loet (2003). The construction and globalization of the knowledge base in inter-human 
communication systems. Canadian Journal of Communication, 28(3), 267-289.
Luhmann, Niklas (1995). Social systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Luhmann, Niklas (2000). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. In Diego 
Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations (pp.94-107). Oxford: Department 
of Sociology, University of Oxford, http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/luhmann94-107.pdf [Date 
of access: April 3, 2010].
© 2010 FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 11(3), Art. 27, Mark Lemon, John Craig & Matthew Cook: 
Looking In or Looking Out? Top-down Change and Operational Capability
Marechal, Kevin (2009). An evolutionary perspective on the economics of energy consumption: The 
crucial role of habits. Journal of Economic Issues, XLIII(1), 69-88.
Mars, Gerry (1994). Cheats at work. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Mathur, Piyush (2008). Gregory Bateson, Niklas Luhmann and ecological communication. The 
Communication Review, 11(2), 151-175.
Mintzberg, Henry (1990). The design school: reconsidering the basic premises of strategic 
management. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 246-275.
Mintzberg, Henry; Ahlstrand, Bruce & Lampei, Joseph (1998). Strategy safari. London: Prentice 
Hall.
Mirchandani, Kiran (1998). Protecting the boundary: Teleworker insights in the expansive concept 
of "work". Gender and Society, 12(2), 168-187.
Newell, Sue & Swan, Jacky (2000). Trust and inter-organizational networking. Human Relations, 
53(10), 1287-1328.
Nonaka, Ikujiro & Takeuchi, Hirotaki (1995). The knowledge creating company. New York: OUP.
Schneidewind, Uwe & Peterson, Holger (1998). Changing the rules: Business-NGO partnerships 
and structuration theory. Greening Management International, Winter, 105-114.
Stacey, Ralph (1996). Complexity and creativity in organizations. San Francisco: Berret-Koehler.
Webb, Carol; Lettice, Fiona & Lemon, Mark (2006). Facilitating learning and innovation in 
organizations using complexity science principles. E:CO, 8(1), 30-41.
Weick, Karl (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Admin Science 
Quarterly, 21, 1-19.
Authors
Mark LEMON is a social scientist with a 
background in community development and the 
construction industry. His research over the past 
twenty years has covered a range of policy 
relevant issues relating to the human—technical 
interface particularly as it affects the natural 
environment and sustainable development. Within 
this broad area he has focused on the factors that 
influence organizational culture, knowledge 
management and the way that multi-disciplinary 
and multi-agency teams define and respond to 
complex environmental problems. He has a 
particular interest in the characteristics of 
integrative research and the development of trans-
disciplinary, cross-cutting, skills and has published 
extensively in this area. 
Contact:
Dr Mark Lemon
Institute of Energy and Sustainable 
Development
De Montfort University
Queens Building, The Gateway, Leicester, UK
Tel.: +44 (0)116 207 8492
Fax: +44 (0)116 257 7981
E-mail: mlemon@dmu.ac.uk
URL: 
http://www.iesd.dmu.ac.uk/staff/mark_lemon.php  
Matthew COOK lectures in the design group at the 
Open University in the UK. He has a practitioner 
background in Urban Planning and over the past 
ten years has taught and researched in areas 
associated with the economics of natural resource 
management. This work has included research for 
the UK government into sustainable product 
service systems and more recently a focus on the 
complexities of technological diffusion.
Contact:
Dr Matthew Cook
The Design Group, Faculty of Maths, 
Computing and Technology
The Open University
Venables Building, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, 
MK7 6AA
UK
Tel.: +44 (0)1908 655964
Fax: +44 (0)1908 654052
E-mail: matthew.cook@open.ac.uk
URL: 
http://design.open.ac.uk/people/MatthewCook.htm 
© 2010 FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 11(3), Art. 27, Mark Lemon, John Craig & Matthew Cook: 
Looking In or Looking Out? Top-down Change and Operational Capability
John CRAIG is an Environmental Management 
consultant who has performed over 200 
(ISO14001) assessments or audits of large and 
small companies in the UK, China, Dubai, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Poland, Singapore, Switzerland, and 
Thailand for UKAS-accredited certification bodies. 
John also advises and sets up management 
systems to meet the requirements of ISO14001 
and has a particular interest in the need to align 
cultural context with such systems. He has 
researched, published and presented widely on 
this requirement.
Contact:
Dr John Craig
GIRAC Ltd and Associates 
The Wilderness
Old Forge Lane, Preston Capes, Northants 
NN11 3TD
UK
Tel.: +44 (0)1327 361782
E-mail: john.craig@girac.co.uk 
Citation 
Lemon, Mark; Craig, John & Cook, Matthew (2010). Looking In or Looking Out? Top-down Change 
and Operational Capability [48 paragraphs]. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative  
Social Research, 11(3), Art. 27, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs1003272. 
© 2010 FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
